reject the idea -again, which seems implied by justificatory liberalism -that when publicly debating and voting upon political issues citizens and legislators should refrain from crucially relying on religious convictions.
We argue in this paper that this widely accepted understanding of justificatory liberalism is confused; properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for excluding religious reasons from politics. We trace this misunderstanding to three common errors -made by both friends and foes alike -in the explication of the theory's core ideas. First, we identify the Error of Consensus. It is almost universally supposed that public justification requires that for every justified law there is at least one justificatory reason that all citizens accept -upon which there is consensus. This is an error. Respect for each as free and equal requires that for a law to be justified every citizen must have some conclusive reason to accept it: they need not all have the same reason. The second error of explication is the Error of Symmetry. Many have held that reasons for supporting a proposal, and reasons for objecting to it, are subject to the same requirements. If justifying a law requires that we give others a reason they accept, then to reject a justification must also require providing a reason others accept. We will show that this cannot be the case. There is a fundamental asymmetry between reasons to justify to another a law and reasons to reject that law. This basic asymmetry allows nonshared reasons to play a crucial role in public justification. The third source of misunderstanding is the Error of Deliberation as Constitutive of Justification. To say that justificatory liberalism is committed to the public justification of laws is ambiguous between (i) it is committed to an ongoing activity of justification -an exchange of reasons between citizens -and (ii) the requirement that laws be justified to all citizens. Many interpret justificatory liberalism in such a way that (i) is the only way to meet (ii), or that (ii) is somehow constituted by (i). They suppose that a justified polity can only arise out of a deliberative politics that aims at public justification. We shall show that this is not so. The core 3 commitment of justificatory liberalism is (ii): that laws be justified. Once we fully appreciate this, we shall see that a deliberative politics in which participants seek publicly justified outcomes through presenting others with good reasons is by no means the onlynor even the most important -way to honor this commitment.
The first two errors lead to a limited understanding of what reasons are relevant to public justification; the third error misrepresents justificatory liberalism as an account of a type of political reasoning or inter-personal justificatory activity. Once these errors have been corrected, we shall see that justificatory liberalism seeks a polity in which all are treated as free and equal, not one in which the reasons of some are privileged over those of others.
Public Justification and its Apparent Hostility To Religious Reasons

Public Justification
Before turning to the errors of explication, let us briefly review the core commitments of justificatory liberalism, which can be understood as a family of political views committed to two core principles. The first is:
The Liberty Principle: "liberty should be the norm, [respect for persons as free and equal requires that] coercion always needs some special justification." 5 Unjustified coercion is wrong.
This "presumption in favor of liberty" is widely embraced in the liberal tradition, from
John Stuart Mill to Joel Feinberg, John Rawls and Stanley Benn. 6 The second principle identifies when the first principle's presumption in favor of liberty can be overcome:
The Public Justification Principle: L is a justified coercive law only if each and every member of the public P has conclusive reason(s) R to accept L as a requirement. 4 The Public Justification Principle maintains that on some specification of the public P, if each member has conclusive reason to accept the law, then the imposition of the law by political authority is permissible, and all are required to act on it. 7 Because their reasoning is the benchmark for public justification some idealization in the description of P is necessary; for example, members of the public must be understood as free from gross defects of reasoning, and because they conceive of each other as free and equal persons they do not have deep antipathy or contempt for each others' values (see further §3.3). In filling out a justificatory view it is critical to provide a compelling specification of P: just how idealized is their reasoning, and how does it relate to that of actual citizens? One
Kantian specification of P is the realm of rational beings; insofar as we act as members of P we act in accord with our status as rational moral beings. Rawls, in contrast, relies on a political conception of persons as reasonable and rational. These are important differences among justificatory liberalisms; for the most part, however, our analysis does not turn on any particular specification, and so is consistent with a number of justificatory liberalisms (however, see § §2.2, 3.1, 3.3).
Notice that justifying reasons must be conclusive: they must defeat other considerations one might have. 6 We further suppose that reasonable pluralism includes religious beliefs: some of the public (P) have religious beliefs while others do not. Some secular liberals argue that fully rational and informed individuals would not have any religious beliefs, while some religiously-inclined philosophers insist that all fully rational individuals would accept at least some religious beliefs. We can set aside this debate: at best it only concerns extreme characterizations of the relevant public in terms of the perfectly rational. We suppose that given a plausible characterization of the deliberative capacities of members of the public, many, but not all, reason on the basis of religious or faith-based considerations.
For present purposes, we need not specify precisely the nature of religious or faith-based reasons (as will be seen, the analysis does not depend on any particular specification, except that they are reasonable and not universally affirmed by members of P.)
Why Public Justification Seems Hostile to Religious Arguments in Politics
Justificatory liberalism, then, is based on the idea that if we are to respect others as free and equal, laws must be justified to them. As Christopher J. It has been objected that intelligibility requirements are difficult to make precise. In contrast to intelligibility, which is required if all members of the public are to view the laws as publicly justified, the shareability requirement -that we all affirm the same justifying reasons as conclusive -is inconsistent with members of the public reasoning on pluralistic standards. 22 In arguments for principles of restraint it is supposed that for
Alf to justify his proposal to Betty it must be the case that she shares his reason in the 10 sense that the consideration (or set of considerations) that justified the law for him does so for her as well. If R is a conclusive reason (or part of one) for Alf accepting L, shareability requires that it also be such a reason for Betty. If we embrace shareability we must follow Rawls in redescribing the justificatory problem so that everyone reasons in the same way: because "everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments." 23 Consequently although the original position begins by posing a problem of choice among people who disagree, the problem is reduced to a choice by one person. 24 This is inevitable if shareability is endorsed. But this raises a puzzle: why would justificatory liberals, starting out with a strong commitment to reasonable pluralism as the outcome of the free use of human reason, embrace a conception of public justification that assumes we reason identically?
Consensus v. Convergence
The shareability requirement and the principles of restraint to which it gives rise are motivated by a particular conception of public justification -the consensus conceptionwhich, Fred D'Agostino notes, can be contrasted with a convergence conception of public justification:
If both A and B share a reason R that makes a regime reasonable for them, then the justification of the regime is grounded in their consensus with respect to R. If A has a reason R a that makes the regime reasonable for him, and B has a reason R b that makes the regime reasonable for her, then the justification of the regime is based on convergence on it from separate points of view. 25 It is manifest how a commitment to consensus justification drives religious reasoning out of public justification. The consensus conception requires that we all have the same reason R to support L. Our assumption of reasonable pluralism is that some, but not all, 11 members of the public have faith-based reasons. Because we cannot reasonably expect all members of the public to actually endorse religious reasons as good reasons, they are not justificatory reasons (or, as the literature refers to them, public reasons). 26 The consensus conception of public justification is hostile to invoking religious reasoning because it is hostile to any genuinely pluralistic reasoning in public justification.
Contrast this to the convergence conception according to which members of the public may arrive at common laws by reasoning based on diverse values and concerns. Here pluralistic reasoning is the very basis of justification. As long as intelligibility obtains, all members of the public acknowledge that everyone engages in genuine reasoning such that each person's conclusions provide her with reasons to accept the law. So everyone can see everyone else as a self-legislator and freely subject to the law. Appealing to a law justified in this manner respects each person as free and equal, without any insistence that we reason in the same way.
It is, then, an error in explicating the core ideals of justificatory liberalism to insist that all justification must be via consensus. By recognizing that reasonable citizens have different reasons to accept a proposal, public recognition of convergence justification reinforces the public awareness of reasonable pluralism. Convergence reasoning, then, expresses a commitment to pluralism of values in public justification. To be sure, there is nothing wrong with a public justification built on consensus -that is one way in which a law might be justified to all. But the aim of consensus tends to be frustrated by the very reasonable pluralism upon which justificatory liberalism is based.
Two Worries about Convergence Justifications
It is something of a mystery why justificatory liberals have relied so little on convergence justifications. Surely one explanation is that on some views the very concept of "a rea-son" demands that all justification must take the form of consensus. Difficulties might arise, however, were convergence rather than consensus required for adequate justification. There are A and R b such that, were A to come to realize that B finds the regime reasonable on account of R b , A would not be able himself to find it reasonable, whatever other grounds he might have for doing so.
For instance, if R b was that B would be able to fulfill her conception of the good in that regime and if A believed B's conception of the good was depraved, then A might not be able any longer to support the implementation of such a regime, perhaps even despite the fact that in it his conception of the good might also be realizable. 28 To focus on the case of religion, if one citizen is a fervent secularist while the other a de- good for me simply is that the laws are bad for you, it is hard to see how we can converge on any laws. The social contract tradition -of which justificatory liberalism is a development -has long wrestled with this problem: if life is thoroughly conflict-ridden there will be no social contract to which all agree. However, as Hobbes so effectively showed, even given great conflicts in aims, there is also great scope for a system of laws that everyone judges as an improvement. 31 Social life is an arena of both competition and mutual benefit; so long as members of the public possess value systems that are not deeply hostile, systems of laws that are endorsed by all are possible. Indeed, liberalism became possible in Western Europe when proponents of different creeds came to moderate their hostility to each other and increasingly valued opportunities for a cooperative social life.
The Minimalist Proviso
It is, then, an error in explicating core ideas that leads justificatory liberals to exclude religious beliefs from public justification. Given the importance of convergence justifications, even if they are not shared by all, religious reasons can enter into a network of justificatory relations, crisscrossing and overlapping diverse reasonable viewpoints to secure an overall public justification. So any blanket prohibition on appeal to religious rea- 15 sons in justifying laws is certainly an error. Even Rawls's permissive view as expressed in his "proviso" is too restrictive: the legitimacy of appealing to religious reasons in the public arena in support of L does not require that "in due course" a "proper" public reason that all citizens can share is introduced to support L. 32 However, as a matter of contingent fact (and so not of core doctrine) it looks plausible for justificatory liberals to endorse in our society a minimalist version of Rawls's proviso even under convergence justification, viz. a citizen should not endorse a law which she believes only has a religious rationale. Contemporary western societies are, as a matter of fact, overwhelmingly secular. Although the United States is a more religious society than Europe, both are largely secular in the sense that all citizens reason most of the time on secular, non-religious, grounds, and only some citizens ever reason on religious grounds. Given this feature of contemporary society, a law for which there is only religious grounding could not be publicly justified, while many laws for which there are only secular groundings will be justifiable. Even citizens who reason on religious grounds share most of these secular concerns: health, housing, earning and protecting income, and public safety -laws that appeal to these are often endorsed by all members of the public.
We must be careful here. The minimalist proviso does not hold that (i) if citizen Alf only has religious grounds for endorsing L, his appeal to these grounds is irrelevant to public justification and in some sense inappropriate in the public sphere. Rather, the minimalist proviso holds that (ii) given the contingent facts of contemporary Western society, if citizen Alf proposes L on purely reasonable religious grounds, for Alf to legitimately endorse L in the public sphere he must believe that there are non-religious grounds that plausibly justify L to reasonable non-religious members of the public.
While minimalist, this proviso is still significant. Its upshot is that, in the conditions of contemporary Western society, a religious citizen must always believe that there is a reasonable secular rationale (though it need not be one he accepts) for any law he proposes, 16 even if his own grounds are thoroughly religious. It is important to realize, though, that this minimalist proviso (a) only follows given contingent facts about contemporary Western society and (b) the rationale for it only supposes correction of the first error of explication. As we shall see, after we correct the third error, the case for the minimal proviso is greatly weakened. 
The Error of Symmetry
Integrity and Non-Domination
The minimalist proviso implies that all justifiable laws in our society must have some secular rationale among their various grounds, and so religious citizens should therefore refrain from endorsing laws that they are convinced have no such rationale. Yet even once the first error of explication is corrected, justificatory liberalism may still provoke the integrity objection ( §2.2). Citizens of faith cannot advocate a law solely because it is based on their own view of the truth. A religious citizen, at least in principle, must be prepared to refrain from acting in the political arena on her conviction as to what the law must be -even if this is a deeply held conviction at the heart of what she values -if she is convinced that there is no secular rationale for it. To impose it absent such a rationale would entail imposing a coercive law on some of her fellows that they do not have conclusive reason to accept. Here the justificatory liberal is clear: if "integrity" requires that one dominate others by imposing publicly unjustified coercive legislation, then integrity must give way to the principle of respect for others. Such integrity would require the domination of fellow citizens, and if acted upon would be wrongful. At the core of the liberal tradition has been the sanctity of conscience, but this has never included the sanctity of one's conscience when it instructs one to coerce others to live by one's own lights. It is not merely justificatory liberalism that denies such an appeal to 17 integrity, but the entire history of liberal thought. John Stuart Mill famously (and rightly) rejected "the logic of persecutors" who insist that we may coerce others into following our conscience because we are right, but others that must not coerce us into following theirs because they are wrong. 34 However, this same liberal commitment to non-domination and sanctity of conscience implies that religious citizens must not have laws imposed upon them which they have no conclusive reason to accept. Even if a secular rationale is necessary in our society for a publicly justified law, it can be defeated by a reasonable religious conviction without any secular backing. 35 If, given her reasonable religious beliefs, a religious citizen has weightier reason to reject a proposal than accept it, the proposal is not publicly justified. It is here that justificatory liberalism protects the integrity of citizens of faith, as it does all citizens. In a pluralist world, the only integrity that all citizens can simultaneously possess is to be free of coercive laws that violate one's reasonable values and understandings of the good.
Those who would prohibit religious belief (unsupported by secular rationales) from performing this defeater role severely undermine liberalism's commitment to nondomination -to ensuring that none are coerced to act in ways that violate their conception of ultimate values. Suppose the more radical exclusionists are correct: any appeal to a religious belief is illegitimate in public justification because these beliefs are not share- However, citizens of faith may reasonably retort that this is not the important value conflict: that conflict is between democratic education and core religious convictions, and in their deliberations religious convictions outweigh the value of shared democratic education. To ignore this retort because it is based solely on religious reasons that are not sup- we have in mind a case in which one employs religious or metaphysical claims to limit the liberty of those who reasonably dissent, and the minimalist proviso is not met, then
Macedo is entirely correct. Liberalism gives no weight to claims that one's integrity requires such imposition on others. However, if we have in mind a case in which the "shape" of basic liberties is determined by some employing their controversial religious or metaphysical claims to reject proposed legislation (even when the rejector's objection does not meet the minimalist proviso), then Macedo is in error: it is precisely such claims to integrity and freedom of conscience that liberals are committed to respecting. We cannot assume that the characteristics of an acceptable proposal for coercion are the same 19 as a good reason to object; this is the error of symmetry. Many justificatory liberals have missed this crucial difference, advancing sweeping declarations about the inappropriateness of appeals to religious convictions in public justification.
Why Strict Symmetry Renders Irrelevant the Public Justification Principle
A plausible account of public justification must reject symmetry. 
The Error of Deliberation as Constitutive of Justification
The Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning
The first two errors of explication have concerned the sorts of reasons that appropriately figure into public justification. Once these two errors are corrected, justificatory liberals who advocate principles of restraint on political discourse ( §2.2) must greatly modify their restraining doctrines. As we have seen, firstly, religious reasons shared among a sub-community may enter into the network of public justification for a proposal and, secondly, all reasonable religious values, even without supporting secular rationales, can serve as defeaters of proposed justifications. We thus far, then, have shown that justificatory liberals are committed to far more permissive principles of restraint -if they are committed to principles of restraint at all. We must now confront the basic question:
what is the motivation for adopting any principle of restraint whatsoever?
"Public reasoning," says Rawls, "aims at public justification….Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept." 37 Such reasoning and argument, he continues, meets the "duty of civility," 38 the underlying idea of which is that if public justification is lim- Because (i) all laws must be publicly justified and (ii) politics is (ultimately) about what laws are to be selected, then (iii) politics should aim at public justification, 21 and so (iv) politics should be a form of public reasoning -arguments addressed to those who disagree with us that they could reasonably accept.
"Deliberative democracy" endorses this principle. As Joshua Cohen conceives of it "[t]he notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive idea of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among citizens." 39 That the justification of the terms of association proceeds through "public argument and reasoning" is the crux of the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning: the aim of having justified terms of association in our polity is to be achieved through public argument and reasoning seeking such justification. If this is so, we would wish the nature of our public reasoning to reflect the conditions for public justification. If reason R* cannot publicly justify our terms of association, or a piece of legislation, then R* should not enter into public reasoning on this matter; and since politics is the arena of public reasoning, R* should not enter into politics. Put this way, it may seem that the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning is an inescapable commitment of justificatory liberalism.
Many equate justificatory liberalism with a type of deliberative democracy. Cohen advocates both, as does Rawls himself. 40 However, there is no intrinsic tie between the two doctrines. We will show that the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning is highly objectionable; since deliberative democracy is committed to it, there is good reason to separate justificatory liberalism from deliberative democracy. Once we do so, the attraction of any principle of restraint quickly fades.
Two Roles of Political Institutions
Because deliberative democracy is based on the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning, it is unable to appreciate the complex role of political institutions in generating political 
Institutions as Generators:
The task of electoral and legislative institutions relating to issue i is to take a set of citizen views (cv 1 …cv n ) about i, and to generate a publicly justified resolution of i.
The contrast between these two conceptions of the role of political institutions correlates with Jon Elster's famous distinction between politics as a forum and as a market. 41 In politics as a forum citizens debate, discuss, and change their views in response to the reasoning of others. At the extreme, the task of electoral and legislative institutions is simply to adequately register the results of the discussion in the forum. In contrast, the "market" view takes as inputs citizens' views that may reflect a wide variety of concerns and interests and seeks to employ institutions that transform these into a justified political outcome. Adam Smith's idea of the invisible hand underlies the conception of political institutions as generators of publicly justified outcomes. As Smith famously put it, in markets a person often acts as if led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good. 42 
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Smith, then, understands market institutions as generating outcomes that achieve the public good, not registering people's views about how to achieve it. Electoral and legislative institutions may be conceived of in a similar way.
System-wide Justification and the Problem of Local Knowledge
We have focused thus far on the simplest justificatory situation, that between two people. As in economics, focusing on a simple two-person exchange is a good place to start, but a bad place to end: once we understand the dynamics of dyadic interactions, we need to develop a theory of public justification among a complex system of interactions characterized by convergence justifications ( §3.2). In a system characterized by such justifications no citizen is in the position to gauge, on the basis of her own experiences, the importance and relevance of any given reason (based on a reasonable system of values)
to public justification. In contrast to a homogenous society characterized by consensus reasoning, no one is in the position to judge whether any given proposal should be rejected because it fails to meet a simple test, such as it is not based on a reason shared by all -it is "sectarian." On the convergence view, the justification of any proposal depends on the reasons that others have. However, our problem is that we do not know what reasons others have in large and complex societies. We have to discover what reasons people have. It is here that justificatory liberals can learn from the analysis of markets.
F.A. Hayek's great contribution to economics was to show how markets discover information. As Hayek understands a modern society, each individual has her own projects and plans; whether she is successful depends on whether she can mesh her plans with those of others. 43 If we are to efficiently pursue our own goals in the context of others pursuing their goals, we must have an idea of whether the resources necessary 24 for our plans are being demanded by others, whether others will be interested in the outputs of our plans and projects, and so on. Each of us has both personal and local knowledge not generally available to others, and yet the success of our plans often depends on knowing the personal and local knowledge of others. Personal knowledge consists of one's knowledge of one's own plans and goals. Local knowledge is: The marvel [of the market] is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction.
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The market, then, sums up the local and personal knowledge of actors across the world, and converts it into the crucial information that each of us must have so that we can use 25 our own local and personal knowledge to efficiently satisfy our aims.
Even when politics does conform to the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning (i.e., the citizen endeavours to register her considered judgment as to what is publicly justified) a surprisingly similar problem arises. 46 
The Constitution of Justification
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If a political system is open and encourages the frank exchange of views among citizens that broadcasts personal and local information, a conscientious citizen can sometimes come to reasonable, tentative, conclusions about the state of public justification on some issue and, so, register her view through political institutions. However, given the complexity of political positions in a large polity under conditions of reasonable pluralism, this knowledge will always be far more tentative than her own local and personal knowledge. That is why the Principle of Politics as Public Reasoning, and its companion idea that political institutions should primarily serve to register the views of citizens, is a poor account of political life: the systemic knowledge of citizens will always be highly fallible. From the perspective of public justification, the best political institutions draw directly on the firmest knowledge possessed by citizens -their own local and personal knowledge -and uses that to generate publicly justified outcomes.
This insight is fundamental to the constitutional project of James Madison. "Justice is the end of government," Madison declared, but he did not think that this end could be secured simply by assemblies that expressed the popular will, or simply by developing a well-educated citizenry. 47 He advocated a constitutional structure that inputs less than perfect and often deeply flawed views about justice and the common good and outputs laws that are at least closer to justice and the common good. This task of designing political institutions that generate justified outcomes has been largely ignored in the explication of contemporary justificatory liberalism 48 (which is all the more surprising since advocates of the doctrine -which has been called "American Philosophical Liberalism" 49 -seem to have forgotten the great American contribution to liberal political theory).
Instead of taking seriously the task of constitutional design as a way to help generate publicly justified outcomes in light of highly imperfect citizen inputs, justificatory liberals have spent inordinate time developing ethical constraints on the activity of justification, with the apparent hope of so perfecting the inputs (views of citizens) that electoral and 27 legislative institutions could be largely relegated to registering these vastly improved inputs. 50 This is a misguided hope: given the reasonable pluralism and the centrality of convergence, the relevant knowledge of such system-wide justification is simply not available to even enlightened and public-spirited citizens. Rather than seeking to restrain citizen inputs, the important project for justificatory liberals is to develop the theory of constitutional government that takes the real world imperfect inputs we confront, and yields laws that tend to be publicly justified.
In developing a constitutional structure of public justification, justificatory liberals should, then, avoid the idea that the main task of political institutions is to correct, record, and refine citizens' views about system-wide justification on issues: we have seen such global judgments tend to be inaccurate. Rather, the chief aim of institutional design is to draw as far as possible on the local and personal knowledge of citizens; if each reports her own judgment and views the institutions may be able to generate more reliably justified outcomes. Now at the core of the idea of public justification is a unanimity requirement: all members of the public must have conclusive reason to accept a law ( §4.2).
This does not mean that a unanimity rule would be appropriate in actual polities: not only are there high decision-making costs to such a rule, but we cannot suppose that the views of actual citizens correspond to the reasoning of idealized members of the public ( §2.1). Nevertheless, the general shape of the constitutional analysis is striking similar to James Buchanan's project of constitutional political economy, which also has an ideal unanimity requirement as a touchstone. 51 In an important sense, both justificatory liberalism and constitutional political economy seek real-world institutions that in some way track a strong Pareto requirement: all must rank a law as an improvement. 52 It may come as a surprise to many that a good deal of the groundwork for the constitutional structure of justificatory liberalism has already been laid by public choice theory. 53 
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Conclusion
In this essay we have traced the attraction of many justificatory liberals to principles of restraint to three errors in explicating the core ideas of the theory. The error of consensus leads to the mistaken claim that all genuine justificatory reasons must be shared by all; so "sectarian" reasons must be excluded from public justification. The error of symmetry conceives of the constraints on proposals for coercive laws being the same as reasons to, evaluate, oppose, or block such laws: so, it is thought, "sectarian" reasons cannot be employed to reject proposed legislation. Lastly, we have pointed to the errors in the persistent idea that publicly justified outcomes must be achieved through a deliberative activity that aims at such outcomes. Under the influence of this idea, the commitment to publicly justified laws leads to a demand that the political debate should exclude bad reasons, and so makes plausible principles of restraint. We have argued that the conditions of reasonable pluralism and convergence justification show this to be unrealistic: it is utopian in the bad sense. Justified political outcomes need not, and often will not, be the result of a refined activity of public reasoning, but of electoral and legislative institutions and procedures that generate outcomes that all members of the public accept, taking as inputs the local and personal knowledge of citizens about their own reasons and concerns.
Our focus has been on "secular" and "religious" reasons, as so much of the debate has been framed in this way. We hope it is clear that, in the end, the analysis does not depend on making sense of this vexed distinction. Understanding public justification does not require classifying reasons into types -be it secular/religious, public/private, or political/comprehensive. Building on any such categorization seems a dubious enterprise. 54 For purposes of meeting the Public Justification Principle what is important is whether a reason -be it "secular" or "religious" -is within the bounds of reasonable 29 pluralism and how it enters into the network of the other such reasons. Moreover, we have stressed that it is an error to take a doctrine of what reasons can enter into the public justification of a law and to infer a doctrine of what reasons are appropriate in political debate. Doctrines that classify reasons into those that can be drawn upon and those that are excluded from the political life of a liberal polity lessen the resources for public justification, for doctrines of exclusion deplete the pool of reasons and information that can enter into the overall network that can justify laws to everyone. To be sure, it has seemed to some that excluding selected types of reasons from public justification and political life does, after all, further the cause of public justification: "private," "sectarian," "religious," or "comprehensive" reasons will then be unable to block "secular," "nonsectarian" proposals. The true cause of public justification, though, is to formulate laws that respect all as free and equal: this cause is not furthered by allowing some to impose laws on those who do not have sufficient reason to accept them.
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